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Abstract:  
This article reviews the Aarhus approach to the study of Islamism as presented in a series of articles by 
Mehdi Mozaffari and Tina Magaard. The core contribution of the Aarhus approach – the argument that 
Islamism constitutes yet another form of totalitarianism – is found to be forceful and thought-
provoking. The academic utility of this approach is difficult to evaluate, however, since empirical 
evidence in the form of structured comparisons is not provided. This is partly due to the lack of a 
definition of totalitarianism to facilitate comparisons with Nazism, Fascism and Stalinism, and partly 
due to a lack of interest in comparisons along other relevant dimensions, including manifestations of 
radicalized/securitized religion drawing on the vocabulary of religious traditions other than Islam. It is 
argued that the definition of Islamism as totalitarianism is upheld by methodologically privileging texts 
over practice and definitional claims over empirical evidence. As such, the approach reflects an 
anthropological and sociological deficit excluding analyses of practices from textual reading and a 
hermeneutical deficit excluding various existing interpretations. Most importantly, these criteria for 
demarcating Islamism have important consequences for security political strategies for uncoupling the 
relations between Islamism and violence. 
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We have seen their kind before. They're the heirs of all the 
murderous ideologies of the twentieth century … They 
follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism. 
(Bush, 2001) 
Out of fear and confusion we have hesitated to name the 
enemy. We proceed as if we are fighting disparate criminals 
united by coincidence, rather than the vanguard of militant 
Islam, united by ideology, sentiment, doctrine, and practice, 
its partisans drawn from Morocco to the Philippines, 
Chechnya to the Sudan, a vast swath of the earth that, in 
regard to the elemental beliefs that fuel jihad, is as 
homogeneous as Denmark. (Helprin, 2004) 
Introduction 
 
Since 11 September 2001, global public debates have intensified around the relationship between Islam, 
Islamism and violence. A major scientific contribution to the understanding of this relationship has 
been formulated by what we label the Aarhus approach to Islamism. This approach consists of a series 
of publications by Professor Mehdi Mozaffari from the Department of Political Science and Post-doc 
Tina Magaard from the Department of Systematic Theology at the University of Aarhus. We have 
chosen to treat them as one approach, since the publications of the two scholars contribute to a 
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common research agenda dealing with Islamism as a movement united by a totalitarian ideology, 
privileging religious texts as evidence. This research agenda is fundamental to a new Center for 
Research in Islamism and Processes of Radicalization, funded by the Danish Ministry of Defence, 
which Mozaffari has recently been appointed to direct. Considered together, these studies support the 
anchoring of a new compound category: Islamofascism. 
 
We find academic as well as strategic problems in this approach, especially as it reproduces 
overly simplified but influential discourses on the relationship between Islam, Islamism and violence. In 
our view, academic research focusing on Islamism and the relationship between Islamism and violence 
should instead aim at disentangling the complexities hiding behind the linguistic singularity inherent in 
the term Islamism. From a strategic perspective, it is urgent to understand what triggers the violent 
movements and actors and the role of religion vis-à-vis other factors behind violent behaviour and 
radicalization processes. 
Dusting for the fingerprints of totalitarianism in order to understand contemporary Islamist 
terrorism surely has practical political implications. The present review of the Aarhus approach to 
Islamism is exactly motivated by the urgent political, strategic and public need to enhance knowledge in 
this area, since wrongful identification and categorization of the phenomenon may easily lead to 
inexpedient and miscalculated policy advice, further escalating the dynamic patterns of violence. 
The research carried out by the Aarhus approach is also politically relevant in a second sense, as 
its claims are an active part of the broader public debate about Islam. This is clearly indicated by 
Maagard’s frequent participation in debates on various public Muslim figures and their supposed 
'double-speech' (Magaard, 2007b) as well as Mozaffari's signature on the manifesto co-authored by 12 
intellectuals (including Salman Rushdie and Ayaan Hirsi Ali) on the occasion of the publication of 12 
cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed by Danish daily Jyllands-Posten (Ali et al., 2006). 
In the following pages, we first discuss the Aarhus definition of Islamism as a totalitarian ideology. 
Secondly, we evaluate the concordance between the definition and the phenomenon it is supposed to cover. 
Thirdly, we question whether these Islamists can be said to constitute one movement. Finally, we raise the 
crucial question of how texts and ideologies turn into observable practices, contesting the methodological basis 
of the Aarhus approach in presupposing an overly simplified – yet still unexplained – causality between 
holy texts and violence. 
 
 
Islamism as a totalitarian ideology 
The main contribution of the Aarhus approach to the study of Islamism is the suggestion that Islamism 
constitutes yet another form of totalitarianism. This thesis is forceful and thought-provoking. However, 
despite the fact that this thesis is central to the Aarhus approach, the key concept of totalitarianism is 
never defined. This lack of a clear conceptualization of 'totalitarianism' makes it difficult, or even 
impossible, to assess whether the phenomenon of Islamism would fit into the general definition of 
totalitarianism.  
However, in order to substantiate the thesis that 'Islamism is a totalitarianism', Mozaffari does 
point out some similarities: ‘They are all violent. They believe in the Führerprinzip: the cult of a 
mythical leader with superman capacities. They are all anti-democratic. They are all “world 
conquerors”. Historically, they are all in different ways one of the major consequences of the First 
World War’ (Mozaffari, 2003a: 2; 2003b: 3). 
One can always find similarities between different phenomena; however, the critical question 
becomes whether the similarities point to a unity which is relevant for some specific purpose. By 
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exclusively focusing on the similarities between Islamism and the totalitarian movements of the 20th 
century, the Aarhus approach chooses to ignore the features otherwise possibly distinguishing them 
from one another: do The Third Reich and the Islamic Republic of Iran constitute the same kind of 
regimes? Can the madâris of Jamaat-e-Islami compare to the Gulag? Is the Muslim Brotherhood a new 
version of the COMINTERN? Simultaneously, other relevant comparisons – to which we will return in 
the next section – are glossed over. 
However, the Aarhus approach is not interested in such comparisons; rather, it is interested in 
grasping the very ‘essence’ of Islamism (Mozaffari, 2007a: 1). This ‘essence’ is captured in a general 
definition allegedly covering the phenomenon of Islamism in all its variety and various manifestations. 
Islamism is defined either as a ‘religiously inspired ideology with a totalitarian interpretation of Islam’ 
(Mozaffari, 2007b; our italics) or as ‘a religious ideology with [a] a holistic interpretation of Islam whose 
[b] final aim is the conquest of the world [c] by all means’ (Mozaffari, 2007a; our italics); a third version 
of the definition adds the adjective [d] ‘regressive’ to characterize the ideology (Mozaffari, 2006: 24). 
Mozaffari argues that Islamism can be manifested in three ‘phases’: 1) first as an ideology, 2) then as a 
movement, and 3) finally as ‘a totalitarian state’ (Mozaffari, 2006: 23). This is not a distinctive feature of 
totalitarianism, however, as most ideologies, including liberalism and social democracy, can be manifest 
as mere ideology, as movement or as state. 
Although Islamism is supposed to be manifest through three phases, the definition proposed by 
Mozaffari focuses on Islamism as ideology. Hence, the question arises as to what exactly makes an 
ideology totalitarian? Although the concept of totalitarianism is never clearly exposed, it is implied that 
a ‘holistic’ ideology is necessarily a ‘totalitarian’ ideology. It is claimed that Islamism offers a holistic 
interpretation of Islam, since it ‘embraces all aspects of Muslims’ life’ (Mozaffari, 2007a: 23) and 
provides an interpretation that ‘is based on the absolute indivisibility of the trinity Din (religion), Dunya 
(way of life) and Dawla (government)’ (Mozaffari, 2007a: 23).  
 The causality or relationship between the four totalitarian aspects of Islamism ([a] holism, [b] 
the aim to conquer the world, [c] the willingness to use all means, and [d] regressiveness) remains 
unclear. In some texts, Mozaffari is arguing on the basis of a causal relationship between a holistic 
approach to religion and the need to conquer the world as well as the willingness to ‘use all means’ 
(Mozaffari, 2007b: 197). The implication of causality between a holistic vision of Islam and violence is 
particularly problematic in light of the fact that ‘holism’ is a part of not just Islamism (radical or not) 
but also a variety of orthodox and traditional versions of Islam. In the modern context, holistic 
understandings of religion prevail as a standard perception among Muslims challenging the secular 
representations of religion being dominant in a European context. Even if Mozaffari insists that we 
should fight Islamists and not Islam (2003a), the definition offered includes many peaceful Muslims. 
 A critical question that the Aarhus approach assumes to have answered by the holism inherent 
in its definition of Islamism is that of how this totalitarian ideology is to be carried out in practice; 
however, this key question is never raised. The Aarhus approach merely affirms that violence is an 
intrinsic part of Islamism as ideology, movement and state, since Islamists are willing to use ‘all means’, 
including violence. Violence is the rule, whereas abstention from violence is merely an ‘exception’ 
(Mozaffari, 2007a: 24). Empirically, however, not all Islamists resort to violence, even if they advocate 
the all-encompassing relevance of Islam. Mozaffari admits that some Islamist groups claim to be non-
violent, but this is merely something that they claim. When the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jamaat-e-
Islami accept participating in democratic elections, this is only for ‘strategic’ or ‘prudential’ reasons 
(2007a: 24), since in reality they remain violent and ready to use violence in order to attain their final 
goal: the conquest of the world. It does not matter what Islamists say about their strategy or what their 
actual practice is; somehow, Mozaffari and Magaard know that Islamists are violent, per se. Since the 
 4 
legitimacy of ‘all means’ has its sources in ‘holism’, violence is part of their definition; not an empirically 
induced or tested conclusion.  
 In order to release the potential of the research agenda, the thesis requires further elaboration. 
First, it is necessary for the Aarhus scholars to provide a clearer definition of ‘totalitarianism’ than is 
currently the case in order to allow for the structured comparison of Islamists with other cases. Second, 
the Aarhus definition of ‘Islamism’ focuses exclusively on ideology. Since it is central to the Aarhus 
approach that Islamism not only comes as ideology, but also as movement and state, the relationship 
between these three 'phases' must be developed and explained. Are Islamist movements and states a 1:1 
application of the ideology? What is the exact nature of this relationship? Third, the Aarhus approach 
would benefit from empirically conducting studies comparing Islamist movements and states with 
totalitarian movements and states. This would enable us to clearly assess whether the Islamist Republic 
of Iran can seriously compare to Nazi Germany. The possibility of this cannot a priori be excluded, but 
the empirical evidence must be provided in a structured manner. 
Islamist Ideology: A Regressive World Conquest? 
A shift in focus from the suggested definition of Islamism to the existing empirical research on the 
cases forwarded by the Aarhus approach reveals a mismatch. This bears traces from the definition, 
rendering certain important dynamics invisible. The two points we will raise in this section relate to 1) 
the description of radical Islamism as a regressive ideology and 2) the claim that radical Islamists 
ultimately aim at conquering the world by establishing a world caliphate.  
Striving backwards? 
Recent analyses challenge the assertion of the Aarhus approach that Islamists represent a religiously 
conservative and regressive point of view. This goes for both classical Islamists such as Abul Ala 
Mawdudi, Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, as well as for contemporary Islamists such as Osama Bin 
Laden. These actors have undoubtedly legitimized violent actions with reference to ‘Islamic authenticity’ 
and discourses on authentic Islam establish the vocabulary facilitating an interpretation of Islam 
presenting itself to be unbendable. Examining the content they load into the vocabulary of authenticity, 
however, this does not mean that they necessarily strive towards the past. 
 When reading both classical and modern Islamists, it is symptomatic for their narratives that 
Islam is first contextualized, since new and modern measures deviating from traditional notions of what 
constitutes legitimate measures are rendered necessary for survival. Their narratives reflect 
dissatisfaction with e.g. specific US policies, including the uncritical support for Israel, the military 
presence in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq and the economic sanctions against Iraq after the 1991 
Gulf War. The modern measures legitimized by presenting an extraordinary setting include the use of 
advanced technology, advanced weapons, martyrdom operations and warfare principles of revenge and 
reciprocity (Sheikh, 2005). After having loaded new content onto the concept of authentic Islam, the 
narratives secondly de-contextualize the concept again (exactly by naming the specific interpretations 
‘authentic Islam’) in order to freeze the possibilities of action and make their 
interpretations/representations of religion unquestionable. 
 To avoid the many restrictions and precautions in traditional fatâwâ on Muslim behaviour in 
situations of war, Bin Laden has for example widened the conventional frame of action with a fatwâ 
allowing the killing of civilians, including women and children, if they are among the ranks of the 
enemy (1998b). In traditional Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, rulings on the conduct of war have been 
interpreted rather strictly, meaning that harming women, children, the elderly, civilians, buildings, crops, 
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the ill, the blind, animals and trees has generally been prohibited by almost complete consensus (Ibn 
Rushd, 1994; cf. Johnson, 2002). Entering into warfare has only been allowed insofar as Muslim 
territory was attacked. Rejecting such interpretational traditions, Bin Laden introduces principles of 
reciprocity and revenge as legitimate standards in situations of war having no precedence in the classical 
past (cf. Bin Laden, 1998a; 2001).  
 As argued by the researchers behind the Chicago Fundamentalism Project (Marty and Appleby, 
1995) and others, a central difference (within all religions) between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘traditionalists’ 
is the way threats are represented (Sheikh, 2005). Fundamentalists argue that a threat against their 
religion is so urgent and dramatic that being more pious or religiously observant in the traditional sense 
means failure. Conventional acts of worship or living a virtuous life in accordance with the life of the 
Prophet Muhammad is not enough under contemporary circumstances. New methods are required to 
efficiently avert the immediate threat against Islam. In this sense radical Islamists – insisting on the 
necessity of the most efficient modern tools to restore authenticity – is rather a strange traditional-
modern synthesis, fostering a highly contextual approach to authentic Islam. 
 The categorization of radical Islamism as regressive fails to capture the role of the context these 
actors are relating to or reacting against. Instead, it confines all explanatory power to the ‘ideology’ of 
Islamism. The Aarhus approach could gain by widening the perspective to include the dynamics 
between text and ideology on one side and context on the other side.  
An offensive movement? 
Another empirical claim inherent in the Aarhus definition of Islamism is that radical Islamists ultimately 
aim to conquer the world by establishing a world caliphate (Mozaffari, 2005: 41). However, this claim, 
implying that radical Islamists act out of an expansive, offensive ideal of change, does not appear to fit 
the actors Mozaffari refers to as Islamists. Recent analyses of the threat constructions in the narratives 
of Abul Ala Mawdudi, Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Osama Bin Laden and Ahmad Ismail Yasin – all 
mentioned in Mozaffari’s publications – challenge that these characters ultimately aim to restore the 
caliphate. To the contrary, the narratives of both of these actors and contemporary Salafi Jihadist 
movements appear pronouncedly defensive or reactive (e.g. Amghar, 2007; Sheikh, forthcoming; cf. 
Diken and Laustsen, 2004: 13; Philpott, 2002: 85; Juergensmeyer, 2000: 145). 
 Robert A. Pape, director of the Chicago Project of Suicide Terrorism, concludes on the basis of 
his analysis of the persons behind suicide attacks between 1995 and 2004 that Al-Qaida is less a result 
of offensive Islamic fundamentalism than of the isolated strategic struggle to make the United States 
and its Western allies withdraw their military presence from Muslim countries (Pape, 2005). In his 
analysis, Samir Amghar calls attention to the circumstance that the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 
‘did not aim to punish the victims for their non-respect of Islamic norms, but to pressure Western 
states, Spain in this case, into withdrawing their troops from Iraq’ (2007: 41). This point is also well 
illustrated in the words of Bin Laden, who stated that the world was ‘already at war’ years before 9/11 
(1998b). 
 Comparative empirical studies on fundamentalism in different religious denominations report 
along the same lines that the perception of being under attack is among the most defining features of 
fundamentalism, legitimizing ‘religious’ violence (Marty and Appleby, 1995: 409). Hence, 
fundamentalism or radical Islamism appears to resemble the practice of conventional security politics in 
the sense that it successfully manages to frame certain acts and issues in a manner elevating their 
importance to a matter of life and death (Wæver, 2004; Laustsen and Wæver, 2003). The rhetoric of 
radical Islamists works in a certain ‘security political’ manner, as the defensive element is a potentially 
strong mobilizing force. 
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 Since the defensive element is characteristic for fundamentalists across different religious 
denominations (Juergensmeyer, 2000), a focus on security political discourses appears to be crucial. The 
development of a two-tracked approach, where research on fundamentalism and security theory is 
brought into fruitful interplay, can produce insights concerning the dynamics between religion and 
radicalism valuable to understanding both the role of religion and the role of security dynamics. It 
could thus be helpful for the Aarhus approach to examine the specific representations of Islam that are 
sustaining security political claims of defending religion and compare this insight with other instances 
of securitized religion. 
 This is not to argue that radical Islamists act only against the background of a crisis and a 
defensive claim, but to cast light on this crucial aspect. As researchers, we have no access to the real 
personal motives of radical actors. Hence, it will always remain a hypothetical possibility that their ‘real 
motive’ is conditioned by backwardness, offensiveness or aggression. Nevertheless, it remains of 
central political and strategic relevance to focus on what makes radical actors successful in mobilizing 
adherents. This is a serious challenge to the Aarhus approach, as it is unable to grasp how the speech 
acts of radical Islamists work without making interpretational claims about the motives of the actors. 
Equally, it does not capture how radicalization can reflect a successful speech act defending different 
dimensions of Islam against existential threats coming from secularism or specific (military) policies 
towards Muslim countries (Sheikh, 2005). Dealing with religion in a manner sensitive to the effects 
different claims of religion have on legitimizing radical behaviour and mobilizing potential adherents is 
highly relevant. At the same time, this can contribute to avoiding generalizing claims on what Islam or 
Islamism is. 
 As we will return to in the concluding section, analytic attention towards the pronounced 
grievances of radical Islamists is also important for strategic reasons, since different threat 
constellations warrant different security analyses and policy.  
Islamism as one movement 
Another central claim of the Aarhus approach is that the phenomenon of ‘Islamic terrorism’ – used 
interchangeably with ‘Islamism’ – is an immediate derivative of the 20th century Islamism (Mozaffari, 
2005: 34); and that as such it constitutes one movement (Mozaffari, 2007a: 27). Mozaffari's insistence on 
the unity of Islamism goes hand in hand with a claim pertaining to the existence of two types of 
‘Islamisms’: A global Islamism covering movements such as Al-Qaida and Hizb ut-Tahrir and a local 
Islamism triggered by national conflicts such as those in Palestine, Kashmir and Chechnya. Such 
differentiation initially sounds reasonable; in fact, however, it does not provide any clarification of 
strategic utility concerning the phenomenon.  
First, contrary to this ‘dualizing’ of Islamism, Islamism immediately appears in more than two versions, 
with more than two stated aims. The existing historical literature and literature dealing with the raison 
d’être of Islamist movements is massive; it suffices to mention the analyses and observations of the most 
well known movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was formed in efforts to Islamize the state; 
one of the most influential texts written by Hassan Al-Banna was addressed directly to the kings and 
rulers of the Islamic world (Al-Banna, 1947). Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan works for Islamization 
through the parliamentary system, which they find legitimate. Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared with an agenda 
to relieve Islam from western colonialism by establishing a Caliphate (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2007). Al-Qaida is, 
as stated by Bin Laden (1998a), on a mission to save Islam from its destruction, since religion is under attack. 
 So we have Islamist movements with different battles, on different grounds, adhering to 
different methods aimed at achieving different ends. The global/local distinction might be useful in 
some circumstances, but it does not help to understand these particularities or – more importantly – 
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how the local and global in fact play together in the movements: it overlooks the double discourses 
Islamist movements can draw upon, e.g. why have the narratives of Hamas changed from presenting 
the liberation of Jerusalem as being a Palestinian duty to instead being a duty for the global Muslim 
ummah? What about the evident existence of a local concern about American military bases in Saudi 
Arabia in the early narratives of Osama Bin Laden? 
 Considering the diversity of the contextual history of the respective Islamist movements and 
actors Mozaffari refers to as proof of the validity of his definition, it is, secondly, fundamentally 
questionable to approach Islamism as one single movement with common roots ultimately aiming to 
restore the lost Caliphate (cf. Mozaffari, 2006: 25). Drawing a straight line from Hassan Al-Banna and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egypt of 1928 over Aytollah Khomeini in the Iran of 1978 up to the 
recent era of Al-Qaida requires arguments which are missing from the historical description of the 
‘Islamic terrorism’ (cf. Mozaffari, 2006: 26–7). On this background, it appears quite speculative to 
define a priori Islamism as totalitarianism which will ultimately be incarnated as a fascist state. At least it 
is against the decisive contextual differences conditioning the existence and aims of different Islamist 
movements.  
 Moreover, recent analysis of Salafi Jihadist movements of the 21st century show how the raison 
d’être of these movements lies in the dissatisfaction with the ‘soft’ approach taken by movements such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood after the 1990s. As Amghar explains, ‘the mobilization power of Salafist 
discourse is thus the consequence of the rejection of the strategies of social and political participation 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood’ (2007: 49).  
 Mozaffari might be correct in claiming that there are similarities between some of these 
movements, but the linkage between 20th-century Islamist movements and 21st-century Jihadist 
Salafism or Islamist terrorism does not in any obvious way represent a linear Darwinist progression (or 
regression) towards a totalitarian state, as otherwise implied. Rather, the current success of Jihadist 
movements reflects that these chose another path, diagnosing re-Islamization movements such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a failure. 
Essentializing Islamism 
From the sections above, it is clear that the lack of attention towards the speech acts of Islamists is a 
constitutive feature of the Aarhus approach, since this allows the approach to make the link between 
totalitarianism and Islamism. It appears as though the Aarhus approach suffers from two deficits: an 
anthropological and sociological deficit excluding analyses of practices from the texts they read and a 
hermeneutical deficit excluding existing varieties of interpretations from their own readings.  
 The Aarhus approach is first and foremost characterized by an anthropological and sociological 
deficit, since it predominantly builds upon analyses of religious texts but lacking political, sociological 
or anthropological contextualization. This tendency to ignore the relevance of empirical evidence is 
clear from the assertion that Islamism constitutes a present danger (Mozaffari, 2006: 23). In order to 
substantiate this assertion, the Aarhus approach does not provide much new data concerning the 
current evolution of Islamism. Evidence is primarily found in classical Islamist texts such as Al-Banna, 
Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini. These Islamist thinkers are presented as ‘contemporary’ (Mozaffari, 
2007a: 23); in fact, however, they are all dead and gone and have been so for quite some time (30 to 60 
years). 
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 In other words, the left-behind texts of dead Islamists appear more important than what is said 
and done today: we do not need to listen anyway, since we already know what Islamists would really like 
to do by inference from the holism inherent in the definition of Islamism. 
 Such prioritization of texts over practice and definitional evidence over empirical evidence gives 
rise to the following question: how dangerous can a text be? If thorough analyses of the Quran or the 
writings of Islamist thinkers should allow us to better assess the present danger of Islamist 
totalitarianism and terror, we must at least reflect on the relationship between such texts and the 
practice of Islamists; however, the Aarhus approach is less than specific as regards the nature of this 
relationship. Indicative of how this question falls between the political science of Mozaffari and the 
textual exegesis of Magaard are their articles, which together constitute the discussion of Islamism in a 
recent volume on the relationship between totalitarianism and extreme friend/enemy images, co-edited 
by Mozaffari (Thorup, Schantz and Mozaffari, 2007). 
 Magaard concludes her contribution by claiming that ‘Read literally, the Quran, the Hadith and 
the Surah purvey a stock of narratives and an arsenal of enemy images for the Islamists to use to 
structure their actions as well as their world views of friends and enemies’ (2007a: 227). To legitimize 
the naked focus on Quranic quotes, she excludes a problem absolutely central to the conceptualization 
of Islamism as totalitarianism: ‘[T]he Quranic enemy images and thematics of violence are used in 
various ways by the individual Islamist groupings. Certain political and sociological considerations 
which are beyond the field of this textual analytical study enter the picture’ (2007a: 227). 
 Mozaffari, however, does supply some of these ‘political and sociological considerations’. In his 
contribution to the same volume, the considerations amount to the enumeration of three ‘motives in 
Islam’ behind the categorization of friends and enemies (2007b: 205–6). The first motive is given by the 
categories of the Quran. Mozaffari notes that these ‘are in principle static and may theoretically not be 
changed. An openness may, however, be noted towards various and at times conflicting interpretations 
clearing the way for various forms of manipulation’ (2007b: 205). It seems to be this openness which 
clears the way for the two additional motives: ‘political criteria’, which is primarily made synonymous 
with a means to mobilize and moreover portrayed as the most common motive, and ‘contextual 
circumstances’ which, according to Mozaffari, include friend/enemy relations varying across sectarian 
divides and other dividing lines among Muslims.  
 Numerous objections can be raised to these ‘political and sociological considerations’: most 
basically, it remains unclear how access is gained to 'motives in Islam' (2007b: 205) and whether this 
actually translates to the motives of Muslims. If Mozaffari is mapping the motives ‘in Islam’, then he 
must first answer a basic question about whose Islam we are talking about. Though Mozaffari agrees 
that competing interpretational traditions among Muslims exist (Mozaffari, 2003a), he neglects to 
explain how he is then able to identify the authoritative ‘motives in Islam’ which can be derived from 
the Quran. 
 Furthermore, it is not clear according to which ‘theories’ and ‘principles’ the Quran is 
unchanging: Is it according to the Quranic text itself? And if so, how can a text – or Mozaffari – 
dismiss the possibility of interpretations changing the meaning of the text? Or is it only according to 
some traditions of Quranic interpretation that the text resists interpretation? Can a text at all resist 
interpretation without help from human beings? If so, how is the Aarhus approach able to gain 
privileged access to the pure text? 
 These questions cover the discussion of what determines history: the structure of a text or the 
performance of agency. The answer is, of course, neither/nor. Magaard is correct in claiming that her 
analyses of Quranic text are merely one part of a ‘multi-causal analysis’ (2007a: 213); however, she 
abstains from explaining why and exactly how the text is an entry into the ‘motives of Islamic groups’ 
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(Magaard, 2007a: 213). This point deserves more scrutiny before answering the question of how 
dangerous a text can be; especially in a situation in which public debate readily accepts prognoses 
concerning the actions and motives of billions based on the quotation of Quranic verses.  
 The hermeneutics of Mozaffari and Magaard is similar to the way fundamentalists read religious 
text: they claim to possess privileged insight into ‘the real’ religion. Mozaffari and Magaard have read 
the text and present textual evidence regarding its correct interpretation; evidence ignoring and 
outnumbering centuries of Muslim scholarship and the interpretations it has given rise to. The friend-
enemy constellations counted and accounted for by Magaard represent the static essence of Islam: 
‘Look – it's right there in the text!’ And that counts more than the ‘explaining away’ reflected in the 
manifold existing exegesis of the Quran.  
Conclusion 
While the Aarhus approach is explicitly interested in researching Islamism in order to combat ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ (Mozaffari, 2006: 26), neither the ‘Islamism’ label nor the definition suggested provide any 
immediate tools for distinguishing militant or radical movements from others. As Islamism both 
appears in violent versions involved in armed conflict and as charity organizations performing a social 
and humanist role, it serves an immediate purpose to add the adjective ‘militant’ or ‘radical’ to the 
research-agenda. Such minor manoeuvres can reduce the stereotyping of Islamist movements and 
enhance clarification about the errand of the Aarhus research agenda.  
 Instead, the Aarhus approach effectively positions Islamism amongst the totalitarian 
movements of the 20th century by equating Islamism and totalitarianism. As Ian Buruma notes, 
however, it is not particularly enlightening to compare Osama Bin Laden with Joseph Stalin or Adolf 
Hitler: ‘They were all very nasty, but other than that there is not much to be gained from such 
comparisons’ (2007: 2); except that this contention holds clear political implications. As Mozaffari 
concludes, ‘the totalitarian danger has not yet disappeared’ (Mozaffari, 2006: 23), hence ‘the world of 
today has no other choice but to continue to combat Islamism, just as the world of 1939 combated 
Nazism and Fascism’ (Mozaffari, 2005: 42). A convenient new enemy has been provided for ‘the free 
world’. 
The Aarhus approach gains most of its leverage by implying that holism and Islamism equals 
totalitarianism and by jumping from text over practice to danger. This approach lacks methodological 
sensitivity to the empirical world and reflects anthropological, sociological and hermeneutical deficits. 
The search for the ‘real motives’ of Islamists renders the Aarhus approach inattentive towards the 
grievances expressed in Islamist narratives. From a strategic perspective, such inattention poses serious 
problems. Not that the Islamists are necessarily correct, but their grievances matter from a dynamic 
perspective on conflict. If they act in defence, perceiving Islam as threatened by Western secularism, a 
firm hand on behalf of secularism might not offer the optimal means with which to defuse the conflict 
(Sheikh and Wæver, forthcoming).  
 The problem with the Aarhus approach to Islamism is the manner in which it releases the West 
from any kind of responsibility for the frustrations pronounced in Islamist narratives. If Islamists are by 
definition categorized as aggressive, faith-driven, unreasonable and expansionist, then elimination of the 
Other seems like the only option for Us to survive. 
 Breaking cycles of violence requires willingness to establish a space for negotiation, politics and 
dialogue; a space that invites varieties of secularists, holist Muslims and Islamists who are willing to 
enter. Insisting on knowing the true intentions of an opponent does not work very well as an invitation; 
quite the opposite, creating such a space requires a self-critical attitude on all sides, i.e. a willingness to 
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evaluate how one's own dogmas, policies and signals contribute to keeping conflicts alive. Obviously, 
an approach which by definition deems the opponent to be a violent, totalitarian contender for world 
hegemony does not require such space, since it would only count as a distraction. 
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Notes 
1. Quotations from texts in the Danish are translated by the authors of this review article. 
2. The historical-sociological comparison of the post-WWI roots of these movements should be on its 
way (Mozaffari, 2007c), and we have yet to see who Mozaffari will appoint to be the mythical leader of 
a unified Islamist movement to compare with Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin. In this review article, we 
concentrate on the consequences of the supposed totalitarian core of Islamist ideology and the 
supposed unity of the Islamist movement. 
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